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Abstract:  
We study the welfare effects of government-backed FDIs in Africa’s farmlands. We build 
an occupational choice model featuring four mechanisms driving these effects. First, 
local farming is subject to social arrangements prescribing that farmers share their crop 
surplus with kin. Second, proceeds from land investment deals are invested to make 
modern inputs affordable to local farmers. Third, these deals cause some farmers to 
shift to wage employment. Fourth, they also entrench export-oriented agriculture, at the 
expense of local markets. We show that three conditions are sufficient for such deals to 
make local people better off: (i) the state has a high capacity and willingness to 
negotiate deals that benefit local people; (ii) these deals create enough jobs; (iii) wage 
employment make displaced farmers better off. Fulfilling these three conditions, 
however, may conflict with the interests of profit-maximizing foreign investors. 
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1. Introduction
We analyze the e¤ects of international land investment deals on the well-being of peo-
ple living in the targeted community, highlighting the mechanisms driving these e¤ects.
We develop a model of occupational choice under foreign direct investments (FDIs) in
farmlands. Local farmers whose farmland is leased to foreign companies either use the
remaining farmland to grow a subsistence crop or shift into wage employment as labourers
of the foreign-owned company leasing their land. We model the e¤ects of FDIs in farm-
lands on the well-being of local populations as resulting from an exogenous change in the
quantity of local land leased to foreign investors.
Government-backed FDIs in Africas farmlands is a fast growing phenomenon which
raises concerns with respect to the welfare of local populations. Remarkably such invest-
ments deals target rural communities characterized by a quasi-subsistence livelihood and
the occurrence of devastating episodes of famine and malnutrition, as recently observed in
Ethiopia and Kenya in the horn of Africa. For a government who lacks the resources needed
to induce farming modernization in rural communities, international acquisitions of local
farmlands may become an attractive proposition. Indeed, many African governments have
pursued or encouraged land investment deals with foreign entities. However, in 2008, a
number of media sources including the Financial Times ran news reports about purported
negotiations between the South Korean rm, Daewoo, and the government of Madagascar,
regarding the lease of 1.3 million hectares of land in Western Madagascar to grow 5 mil-
lion tons of maize annually by 2023 (Daniel and Mittal, 2009). News of this deal created
a tremendous outcry in Madagascar, leading to civil unrest and violence, and sparking
worldwide debate on international acquisition of farmlands in developing countries.
FDIs in farmlands referred to as land grabsby their critics are the purchase or
lease of farmland by food-insecure nations and by private investors in poor countries for
the purpose of securing their own food supplies and/or to produce biofuel (Daniel and
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Mittal, 2009). According to the UNs Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), FDIs
in farmlands are rooted in a combination of factors, including the global food crisis of
2007 and 2008 that sparked sharp hikes in food prices worldwide, pressure from growing
populations (particularly in Asia) and climate change. While most land-rich developing
countries have been targeted, Africa is a particularly hot spot, attracting interest from
investors from the likes of China, India, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Many
African countries, including Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique and Somalia have
become key recipients of FDI in land (Cotula et al., 2009). In Mozambique, for example,
the World Bank estimates that the demand for farmland from foreign investors is more than
twice the total quantity of land being cultivated in the country (Deininger and Songwe,
2009). In its 2011 Report4, the US-based Oakland Institute reveals that "in 2009 alone
nearly 60 million hectares an area the size of France was purchased or leased in Africa."
In its 2011 Country Report for Ethiopia, the Oakland Institute also reveals that, since
2008, at least 3,619,509 hectares of land have been sold or leased to foreign investors. In
its 2011 Country Report for Mali, the corresponding gure was 819,567 hectares of fertile
land in 2010, much of which involves crops for biofuels. It is also reported that, although
they oppose the deals, most local communities in Mali a¤ected by foreign acquisition of
peasants farmland are forced to contend with serious disruptions and threats to their
livelihoods due to a poor ability to organize socially (Oakland Institute, 2011). Drawing
on these gures as well as on reports of social uprisings in some rural communities in
Africa, critics of land investment deals suggest that a government that is acting in the best
interests of its communities will not approve the sale or lease of farmlands to foreigners
(Cotula et al., 2009). This view suggests that African governments that have negotiated
or are negotiating land lease contracts with foreign investors may not be acting in the best
interests of the threatened communities.
4Available online at http://media.oaklandinstitute.org/press-release-understanding-land-investment-
deals-africa
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But there are not only critics of FDIs in Africas farmlands. They also have supporters,
including international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). These supporters claim that, if properly conducted,
FDIs in farmlands can only result in a win-win situation both for the investors and the
targeted communities. There are three angles to their arguments. First, they argue that in
Africa, large areas of suitable land are either unused or under-utilized, which means that
leasing or selling them to foreign investors may not lead to massive displacement of peas-
ants. Second, even if peasants are displaced, they may simply shift to wage employment,
either directly with the foreign companies leasing their farmland, or indirectly through up-
stream and downstream linkages created by the land investment deals (FAO, 2009). Third,
the induced commercialization of agriculture can usher in much needed transformation in
local farming practices through technology transfer to local communities (FAO, 2009). But
if FDIs in Africas farmlands bring such opportunities to local communities as supporters
claim, then why is there opposition (both tacit and active) to these deals in Africa?
Africa di¤ers from other landrich regions at least in three respects. First, its rural
communities do not have legal tenure over the land they farm, and therefore in most
cases cannot directly negotiate the land deals with foreign investors. Second, African
countries generally lack well-established formal land markets, which makes it di¢ cult to
set land prices (Cotula et al., 2009). Third, Africas rural communities are also a home
for social arrangements that have adverse e¤ects on the use of modern farming methods
(Seavoy, 2000). For example, most parts of Africa have a culture of forced mutual help that
presents farmers with a social obligation to share their surplus (if any) with less fortunate
kin (Kazianga, 2006; Platteau, 2006; Alby and Auriol, 2011). Such social arrangements
have been shown to hold back progress and innovation in rural activities (Seavoy, 2000),
resulting in under-utilization of farmland. While the rst two characteristics of rural Africa
support the outcry against international acquisition of local farmland, the third one actually
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suggests that there may be a role for land investment deals in the promotion of e¢ cient
use of farmland. Yet, with millions of hectares of farmland now under the rm ownership
of food-insecure richer countries, the jury is still out on what is perceived as yet another
episode in the global scramble over Africas riches. At the center of this emerging debate
are issues ranging from concerns for biodiversity, food security in Africa and the welfare of
rural communities (Cotula et al., 2009).
In this paper, we restrict our focus on the welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands. Suppose
that foreign investors are acting on behalf of a wealthy, but food-insecure, country, such
that the primary reason for the investment is to secure its long term food security. Assume
that such international investment deals reduce total farmland available to local farmers.
This may either lead to the displacement of local farmers, or to the reduction in farm
size, which critics of such deals argue are the culprit of their perceived unpopularity. Now,
suppose that the government uses the proceeds from land investment deals to subsidize the
costs to local farmers of modernizing their farming methods so as to increase acreage yields.
Modernization may involve the use of commercial inputs such as seeds and fertilizers, as well
as the building of locks and dams to improve the practice of irrigation farming. Such a move
may mitigate the negative e¤ect of a reduction in farm size. Furthermore, to the extent that
FDIs in farmlands lead to job creations either directly or indirectly, displaced local farmers
may shift into wage employment as their new source of livelihood. But displaced farmers
would now need to purchase their food on the market. For their new livelihood to not
make them worse o¤, their purchasing power must not be less than what they would have
expected in the absence of land investment deals. However, their purchasing power also
depends on food prices. If food prices are too high, perhaps due to global food insecurity,
then land investment deals that displace local people may simply become a mechanism
through which wealthy, but food-insecure, countries dump their food insecurity problems
onto poor African countries. The win-win argument put forward by supporters of land
investment deals therefore needs to be formally explained, so as to highlight the conditions
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under which mutual gains can be realized.
The model we use to address this issue includes four important features. First, lo-
cal subsistence farming is subject to social arrangements prescribing that farmers with a
surplus (those who exert a high modernization e¤ort) share their crop surplus with kin
(Kazianga, 2006; Platteau, 2006; Alby and Auriol, 2011). Because of this social obligation,
the individual level of modern inputs use may deviate from its socially optimal level.
Second, proceeds from land investment deals are invested to make high-quality seeds,
fertilizers, and irrigation use a¤ordable for local farmers. Some of these basic inputs are
often beyond the means of smallholder African farmers. In a case study of Malawi, Flesh-
man (2008) reveals that fertilizer costs the equivalent of about $50 a bag, which may be
too expensive for a smallholder African farmer, while buying it on credit may be too great
a risk for farmers at the mercy of unreliable rains and poor-quality seeds. He also reveals
that when in 2005 the government of Malawi began subsidizing fertilizers and high-yielding
seeds for Malawis smallholders, yields response was dramatic. With aid resources to Africa
fast dwindling, this case study of Malawi suggests that using proceeds from international
land investment deals to subsidize the costs of modernizing farming methods can indeed
turn such deals into a win-win situation.
Third, FDIs in farmlands cause local peasants to shift into wage employment as their
new source of livelihood. There is evidence that this feature of land investment deals
is characteristic of land investment deals that target African rural communities (Daniel
and Mittal, 2009; Oakland Institute, 2011). This reallocation of human resources can
act as an indirect compensation mechanism, as it may stop international acquisition of
local farmlands from reducing farm size among the local people who remain in a quasi-
subsistence livelihood. By pulling some peasants out of subsistence farming, international
acquisition of local farmland may reduce pressure on land availability, which may, in turn,
increase output from subsistence farming. Like the other features of the model, reallocation
of human resources provides yet another channel through which land investment deals can
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be win-win.
Finally, FDIs in farmlands entrench export-oriented agriculture, causing displaced local
farmers who shift to wage employment to become dependent on imported substitutes for
the subsistence crop that they previously grew. This feature characterizes most existing
land investment deals in Africa, where such deals target the acquisition of farmlands in
communities that are most vulnerable to food crisis (Daniel and Mittal, 2009) for produc-
tion of export crops including non-food agricultural commodities and biofuels (Daniel and
Mittal, 2009; Cotula et al., 2009). Unlike the other three features of our model, there-
fore, this one provides a channel through which land investment deals may undermine the
well-being of the local population, particularly in the context of a global food crisis charac-
terized by rising food prices. We show that a model incorporating these four main features
lends support to concerns about the proliferation of unregulated land investment deals in
Africa a continent that is a hotbed of food insecurity, as illustrated by frequent episodes
of food crisis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and even Tunisia and Egypt. In
particular, we identify three su¢ cient conditions for foreign acquisition of farmland to make
local people better o¤: (i) The local government must have the capacity and willingness to
negotiate lucrative land deals with foreign investors; (ii) land investment deals must create
su¢ cient employment opportunities for displaced peasants, such as through adoption of
labour-intensive technologies or signicant backward and forward linkages; and (iii) dis-
placed peasants who shift into wage employment must not face excessively high costs of
living, such as in the form of high food prices. We then argue that fullling these three
conditions, however, may conict with the interests of prot-maximizing foreign investors.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst theoretical analysis of the welfare
implications of FDIs in Africas farmlands, although many case studies of, and reports on,
land investment deals exist (e.g., Deininger and Songwe, 2009; Daniel and Mittal, 2009;
Cotula et al., 2009). For example, Deininger and Songwe (2009) outline the pillar of suc-
cessful land investment deals, while warning that the modernization they may bring does
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not necessarily improve the welfare of local people. Daniel and Mittal (2009) question the
viability of the win-winargument that has been o¤ered to quell concerns about land in-
vestment deals, by pointing to the gravity of the risks of removing the issue of food security
for the worlds poor from the forefront of the international debate. We build upon this lit-
erature by revealing the conditions that are su¢ cient for land investment deals to improve
the experiences of local communities in which land is leased or purchased. In environments
where these three conditions are not met, concerns about the well-being of local popula-
tions may be warranted. First, if regulations to implement these three conditions were to
be put into place by the governments of targeted countries, claims that land investment
deals are a win-win situation for both parties may be unrealistic. For example, the high
prices for farmland required to adequately compensate local populations may discourage
foreign investors. Furthermore, a regulation that makes the host nations domestic food
security the primary purpose of foreign acquisition of local farmlands may stand in conict
with foreign investorsvested interest in outsourcing food or biofuel production to their
respective countries of origin, a strategy aimed at helping outsourcing countries escape the
vagaries of prices on international markets (GRAIN, 2008). Last but not least, a regu-
lation mandating the adoption of labour-intensive technologies by foreign investors may
conict with these investorsprot-maximizing objective, which again may reduce their
interest in making deals with host nation governments. Our study thus cast doubts on
the wisdom of the "win-win situation" put forward by supporters of foreign acquisitions of
African farmlands, particularly when the targeted countries are themselves food-insecure
(such as Ethiopia, South Sudan, Somalia and Madagascar) and given that foreign investors
are private prot-oriented agents not humanitarian aid-donors.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the environment
in which such investments occur. Section 3 discusses the welfare e¤ects of these land deals.
Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
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2. The Setup
Government-backed FDIs in farmlands is a fast growing phenomenon which raises concerns
with respect to the welfare of local populations. In this section, we develop a framework to
capture the potential e¤ects of foreign acquisition of African farmlands and also highlight
the mechanisms driving these e¤ects.
Consider a rural community populated by a unit mass of ex-ante homogeneous agents,
which we have referred to as peasants. The economy is endowed with a xed stock of
land, Z, which can be used to produce crops for either quasi-subsistence or commercial
purposes. Land is the property of the state. The government allocates some of the land to
peasants (N) for subsistence use (including farming, livestock herding, hunting or foraging)
and leases part of it to a representative foreign rm (F ), at a price, pz, per unit of land
leased. We assume that proceeds from farmland leased to the foreign rm are benevolently
allocated to make high-quality seeds and fertilizers a¤ordable for peasants so as to boost
modern inputs use in farming.
Total farmland used by peasants is denoted by ZN and total farmland leased or sold to
the foreign rm is denoted by ZF , with
ZN + ZF = Z: (2.1)
Each peasant has a choice between subsistence farming (s = 1) and wage employment
(s = 0) as their source of livelihood. Wage employment yields a wage, !, which is used to
purchase an imported substitute for the domestically grown subsistence crop.
For each peasant, the payo¤ of choosing occupation s in the presence of international
land investments is given by his level of consumption c (s):
Vs = c (s) : (2.2)
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Vs denotes the quantity of food consumed when the peasant has occupation s:
c (s) =
8<: cm if s = 0c1 if s = 1 ;
where cm is the quantity of an imported substitute of the subsistence crop that is consumed
when displaced peasants shift to wage employment as their new source of livelihood and c1
denotes auto-consumption of subsistence output by a peasant involved in quasi-subsistence
farming.
A peasant who chooses occupation s = 0, faces the following budget constraint for
purchasing imported food:
pmcm  !; (2.3)
where pm denotes the relative price of the imported substitute and !, the labor wage.
2.1. Quasi-Subsistence Livelihood
An important feature of this rural community is that peasants face social pressures to hold
on to their harvested surplus, if any. We use  to denote the fraction of a peasants harvest
that he is able to protect from the social obligation to share his surplus with members of
the community, including extended family members. To borrow the terminology used by
Alby and Auriol (2011), one can think of 1   as a community or extended family tax.
A.1. Given his harvest, y, and the average harvest in the community, y, the share of his
own harvest that a peasant involved in quasi-subsistence farming is able to protect
from the social obligation to share with kin, , is strictly decreasing in his economic
status within the community:
 =

y
y
"
;
where " 2 (0; 1) is an e¢ ciency parameter.
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When y=y > 1, the peasant with harvest y will be said to have harvested a surplus
relative to his subsistence need, which is dened by the average crop harvest, y. The
peasant with a harvest of y=y < 1 has a crop decit and thus may receive handouts from
the rest of the community, as a mutual help mechanism. Only when y=y = 1 will a peasant
be able to protect all his harvest from kin. Assumption A:1 states that having a harvest
surplus relative to the community average exposes the peasant to social predation in the
community, which creates a disincentive to exert a high farming modernization e¤ort, in a
sense we will make more precise below.
Production of the subsistence crop requires farmland, z, and a composite input in
quantity e, denoting, for example, seeds and fertilizers. The level of harvest for a local
subsistence farmer who uses a quantity e of a composite input on a farm of size z is thus:
y = ze; (2.4)
where  +  = 1, with ;  2 (0; 1). We take the level of commercial input use, e, as a
measure of local farmers modernization e¤ort.
A local farmers level of auto-consumption thus is given by
c1 = y   pee; (2.5)
where pee denotes production costs, measured in units of subsistence good, and pe, the
exogenously given per unit cost.
Combining Assumption A:1 with (2.5), we obtain a typical farmers level of auto-
consumption as follows:
c1 = y
"y1 "   pee: (2.6)
In other words, the lower the average harvest, y, the lower the level of auto-consumption
for a typical local farmer.
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2.2. Optimal Use of Modern Inputs
As is the case in most rural societies, assume that all local farmers receive an equal plot
of farmland (Seavoy, 2000), such that they face a land use constraint of zn = ZN , where
n 2 [0; 1] denotes the total number of peasants involved in quasi-subsistence farming. We
can then use (2.1) to obtain per capita farm size among local farmers as follows:
z =
Z   ZF
n
; (2.7)
where Z   ZF  ZN . We can then combine (2.7) with (2.4) to obtain a typical local
farmers harvest as follows:
y =

Z   ZF
n

e: (2.8)
Since all local farmers are assumed to receive an equal amount of farmland, average crop
harvest in the community is given by
y =

Z   ZF
n

e; (2.9)
where e > 0 is the average farming modernization e¤ort by local farmers as a whole. The
average harvest in the community, y, therefore embodies the subsistence farming norms
embedded in e, the average farming modernization e¤ort in the community. Substituting
(2.8) and (2.9) into (2.6) and rearranging yields a typical local farmers auto-consumption
level as follows:
c1 =

Z   ZF
n

e"e(1 ")   pee: (2.10)
In other words, subsistence farming norms are an important determinant of local farmers
well-being. In particular, the average farming modernization e¤ort within the local farming
community, e, and a farmers own modernization e¤ort, e, are strategic complements in his
level of auto-consumption, c1. Since e is set externally from a local farmers point of view,
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his own modernization e¤ort (as measured by the level of use of modern input) may be
socially suboptimal. A question of interest is therefore whether international acquisition
of local farmland that displaces some local farmers can correct for this externality.
To address this issue, assume that the government benevolently invests the proceeds
from international acquisition of local farmland in the subsidization of the cost of modern-
izing local farming. More formally, let
pe =   pzZF (2.11)
where  > 0 denotes the status quo per unit cost level,  is a positive scale operator mea-
suring the e¢ ciency of public investment, pzZF , in the reduction of farming modernization
costs. To ensure that prices are always non-negative, we assume that
  pzZ  0:
This feature of the cost of farming modernization provides a channel through which in-
ternational acquisition of local farmland can improve the lives of local farmers. We will
return to this issue further below.
2.3. The Foreign-Owned Company
The representative foreign-owned company produces a cash crop solely for export using
rented capital, KF , leased or purchased farmland, ZF , and hired labor, LF . The cash crop
is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas function:
YF = Z

FL

FK

F ; (2.12)
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where ,  and  are factor shares satisfying the constant return to scale condition  +
 +  = 1, with ; ;  2 (0; 1). The labour input constraint is given by
LF  1  n; (2.13)
where 1 n denotes the total number of displaced peasants who shift to wage employment
as their new source of livelihood. Under perfect competition, the foreign-owned company
pays a market-clearing wage of
! = pFZ

FK

F (1  n) 1 (2.14)
to labourers and rents an amount of capital, KF , that solves the following equation:
r = ZFL

FK
 1
F :
At the end of this process, the foreign company claims a surplus of
F = (1    )ZFLFKF   pzZF : (2.15)
As the foreign-owned company is a price-taker in capital markets,5 the optimal level of
capital used is given by
KF =

ZF (1  n)
r
 1
1 
: (2.16)
Substituting (2.16) into (2.14) gives the following market-clearing wage:
! =  (1  n) ( 1  1  )

r
 
1 
Z

1 
F : (2.17)
5This is likely to be the case, when the foreign rm borrows on international markets.
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Clearly, foreign acquisition of peasantsland (i.e., an exogenous increase in ZF ) tends to
raise the wage rate received by displaced peasants who are employed as labourers in the
foreign-owned company, although the magnitude of this e¤ect depends on the labour share
among production inputs, . For example, if production described by this function is highly
capital-intensive, the labour share will be relatively small, and the wage e¤ect of foreign
acquisition of peasants farmland may be negligible. In this context, there will be little
induced reallocation of peasants from subsistence activities to wage employment, with the
result that average farm size in the community decreases.
But the positive e¤ects of foreign land acquisition do not only operate through the
reallocation of labour. They may also arise through a change in peasantslabour e¤ort in
subsistence farming, as we show below.
2.4. FDIs in Farmlands and Local FarmersUse of Modern Inputs
How does international acquisition of local farmland a¤ect a peasants farming modern-
ization e¤ort? To address this question, we rst compute the payo¤ of a peasant involved
in subsistence farming. We then combine (2.2) with (2.3), and (2.10) to get the following
payo¤:
V1 (e; e; n; ZF ) = e
"e(1 ")

Z   ZF
n

  pee: (2.18)
Observe from (2.18) that international acquisition of local farmland has two e¤ects on the
payo¤ of subsistence farming. On the one hand, it tends to reduce farmland available to
local people (the term Z ZF
n
). On the other hand, it reduces the marginal cost of exerting a
high farming e¤ort (the term pe as dened in (2.11)). Which of these two e¤ects dominates
determines the net e¤ect that international acquisition of local farmland has on the optimal
farming e¤ort chosen by a typical local farmer, as we show below.
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A typical peasants problem is thus to choose their e¤ort, e, to solve
max
e
V1 (e; e; n; ZF ) :
For an interior solution, this maximization problem can be written as follows, using (2.7):
e = e"=

 (1  ")
pe

Z   ZF
n
 1
; (2.19)
where  = 1  (1  ") . The following e¤ects can thus be derived from (2.19):
Proposition 1. (i) A local farmers modernization e¤ort decreases with the size of the
population of the peasant community, n: @e=@n < 0:
(ii) It rises with an exogenous increase in the average modernization e¤ort in the rural
community: @e=@e > 0:
(iii) International acquisition of local farmland (i.e., an exogenous increase in ZF ) has an
ambiguous e¤ect on a local farmers modernization e¤ort:
@e=@ZF > 0, if
pz >
 1pe
Z   ZF (2.20)
and @e=@ZF < 0, if
pz <
 1pe
Z   ZF : (2.21)
Proposition 1-(i) is a direct implication of the production technology being constant-
to-return to scale in land and the composite modern input, as shown in (2.8). Proposition
1-(ii) suggests that subsistence farming norms that lower the average farming moderniza-
tion e¤ort adversely a¤ect peasantswell-being, in the sense that they tend to discourage
e¤ort to modernize farming through the use of modern inputs such as high-yielding seeds
and fertilizers. The social obligation to share any crop surplus with other members of the
peasant community discourages such e¤ort because it suggests that accumulating a har-
vested surplus is pointless, and will face a punitive community tax of 1   . Proposition
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1-(iii) thus suggests that land leases to foreigners by a benevolent government, if well nego-
tiated as per condition (2.20), can counter the adverse e¤ects of subsistence farming norms
that impede high modernization e¤ort. Only when land leases to foreigners are poorly
negotiated, as described by (2.21), will the leases reduce farmersuse of modern inputs.
3. The Welfare E¤ects of FDIs in Farmlands
In this section, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands, highlighting the mech-
anisms that drive these e¤ects. Recall that the level of use of modern input by a typical
peasant in this environment is assumed to be positively related to the average level of mod-
ern input use in the peasant community. To the extent that foreign acquisition of peasants
farmland is compensated by subsidization programs that reduce the costs of modernizing
farming practices, such an externality can be countered, thereby nudging the level of farm-
ing modernization towards its socially optimal level. This e¤ect on farming practices is one
of the rationales for foreign acquisition of peasantsfarmland. A second rationale involves
the labour market, as international acquisition of local farmland displaces some farmers,
pushing them into wage employment as hired labourers in the foreign-owned company.
This reallocation of human resources away from subsistence farming can, depending upon
its magnitude, ease the pressure on farmland caused by international acquisition of local
farmland.
Taken individually, however, each of these two rationales can be undermined by any of
the following issues. In relation to any prospective reduction in the cost of modernizing
subsistence farming, we should consider the compensation that comes in the form of the
subsidization of commercial inputs. A problem can arise if the government is not account-
able to the peasant community, in which case the compensation may not be received in
full. Even if the government were to act benevolently, such that all the proceeds from
leasing farmland to the foreign-owned company are totally invested in the subsidization of
16
commercial inputs used by subsistence farmers, there is also the question of whether the
government has the capacity to negotiate adequate compensation with the foreign-owned
company. The potentially negative outcome is that the compensation received will be too
small to have any signicant impact on peasantslivelihoods.
We can also consider the displacement of local farmers induced by foreign acquisition
of local farmland. We assume that displaced farmers shift into wage employment. There is
no problem in this regard if the production process adopted by the foreign-owned company
is labour-intensive. If this process is either capital-intensive, or creates few backward and
forward linkages, then the potential for job creation may be negligible: this could result
in a more than proportional reduction in farm size in the peasant community. Below, we
provide an analysis of these rationales, keeping track of the related potential problems.
3.1. FDIs in Farmlands and the Payo¤ to Subsistence Farming
In this subsection, we discuss the e¤ects of international acquisition of local farmland on
the payo¤ to subsistence farming. At this stage, it is important to note that since peasants
are presumed identical, in equilibrium, if one peasant obeys the subsistence farming norm,
e, all of them will obey it, thus leading to an identical e¤ort level of e = e. Therefore, on
the basis of (2.19), and making use of (2.11), we obtain the equilibrium level of farming
modernization e¤ort as follows:
e =

 (1  ")
  pzZF
 
Z   ZF
n

; (3.1)
since 1  = . With the determination of the equilibrium level of farming modernization
e¤ort, we can now compute the equilibrium payo¤ to a peasant who makes the occupation
decision s = 1, by substituting the equilibrium e¤ort level back into (2.18), and re-arranging
terms:
V1 (n; pz; ZF ) = [1   (1  ")]

 (1  ")
  pzZF
 
1 

Z   ZF
n

: (3.2)
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Expression (3.2) shows that international acquisition of peasantsfarmland has two oppo-
site e¤ects on a typical peasants welfare. First, there is a negative e¤ect from the reduction
in per capita farmland, z =
Z   ZF
n
, used to grow the subsistence crop. Second, there is a
positive e¤ect due to the fact that proceeds from international land investment deals are
invested in the reduction of the cost of modernizing subsistence farming.
Di¤erentiating (3.2), it can be established that
@ V1 (n; pz; ZF )
@ZF
=

pz
pe
  1
Z   ZF

V1 (n; pz; ZF ) :
On the other hand, it follows from (3.2) that
@ V1 (n; pz; ZF )
@n
< 0:
We have just established the following proposition
Proposition 2. The payo¤ to a subsistence farmer is lower, the larger the population of
such farmers, n. Furthermore, international land investment deals (i.e., an increase in ZF )
raises this payo¤ if condition (2.20) holds, and reduces it if condition (2.21) holds instead.
The rst part of Proposition 2 is an implication of Proposition 1-(i) which suggests that
smallholder farmers tend to practice low input agriculture. This results in a low payo¤. The
second part of Proposition 2 suggests that unless the government can negotiate a su¢ ciently
high land price, pz, international acquisition of local farmland is most likely to reduce the
payo¤of remaining a subsistence farmer. This low payo¤, in turn, may push some peasants
out of subsistence farming and into wage employment as labourers in the foreign-owned
company that is leasing some of their farmland. Such a reallocation of peasants across
occupations may, in turn, mitigate the tendency of international acquisition of local to
cause a reduction in farm size in the peasant community. Arguably, for this to happen,
the foreign-owned companys production operations must be su¢ ciently labour-intensive,
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as we show further below.
3.2. FDIs in Farmlands and the Payo¤ to Wage-Employment
Recall that in the presence of international acquisition of local farmland, peasants initially
in unit mass have the option to pursue two di¤erent occupations: Subsistence farming or
wage employment. A peasant who elects to supply labour earns a wage, !, and uses it to
nance consumption of an imported substitute. Using (2.2), (2.3) and (2.17), we can write
the utility payo¤ associated with this occupational strategy as follows:
V0 (n; pm; ZF ) =

pm
(1  n) &

r
 
1 
Z

1 
F ; (3.3)
where
& =
1    
1  
is as found in (2.17). The following Proposition thus can be established by di¤erentiation
of expression (3.3).
Proposition 3. International land investment deals (i.e., an increase in ZF ) raises the
payo¤ to wage employment, as does an increase in the number of subsistence farmers, n.
However, high food prices (an increase in pm) reduce it.
Both of these results can be easily expected because both n and ZF a¤ect the wage
received by laborers. With both Propositions 2 and 3 in hand, we can now proceed to
determine the equilibrium allocation of the peasant communitys human resources across
activities (subsistence farming and wage employment). We undertake this task below.
3.3. Equilibrium E¤ects of FDIs in Farmlands
When the situation is described by (n; pm; pz; ZF ), a peasant will choose to remain in the
community and undertake subsistence farming if and only if the associated utility payo¤
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exceeds the utility payo¤ from wage employment:
V1 (n; pz; ZF ) > V0 (n; pm; ZF ) .
The peasant will choose to leave subsistence farming and become a labourer in the foreign-
owned company if and only if
V1 (n; pz; ZF ) < V0 (n; pm; ZF ) :
Peasants are indi¤erent as to which occupation they will pursue if
V1 (n; pz; ZF ) = V0 (n; pm; ZF ) :
Figure 1 below illustrates the existence of the equilibrium, as characterized by the size of the
peasant community after foreign acquisition of local farmland, n. This equilibrium occurs
at point A in gure 1, when the downward-sloping curve intersects with the upward-sloping
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curve.
Figure 1. The e¤ects of land investment deals on the size of the
peasant community, n
The downward-sloping curves represent the payo¤ of engaging of a subsistence farmer, V1,
as a function of the size of the peasant community, n, a for a given level of ZF . These curves
are drawn on the basis of Proposition 2. The upward-sloping curves represent the payo¤
from wage employment, V0, also as a function of the size of the peasant community, n, and
for a given level of ZF . These curves are based on Proposition 3. Point A then gives the
equilibrium size of the peasant community, corresponding to the intersection between the
original down-sloping curve and the original upward-sloping curve. An interesting question
therefore arises: How does a change in the quantity of local farmland leased to the foreign-
owned company, ZF , a¤ect the equilibrium size of the peasant community, n? Since both
V1 and V0 depend on ZF , an exogenous change in ZF will prompt a shift of both the
downward-sloping and upward-sloping curves represented in gure 1. As per Proposition
2, the e¤ect of a change in ZF on the original downward-sloping curve representing the
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function V1 is ambiguous. This curve may either shift down and to the left (the downward-
sloping light-blue curve in gure 1) or up and to the right (the downward-sloping green
curve in gure 1). By contrast, on the basis of Proposition 3, the e¤ect of a change in ZF on
the upward-sloping curve that represents the function V0 is non-ambiguous: It shifts this
curve up and to the left, as shown in gure 1. Depending on the magnitude of this shift, the
equilibrium size of the peasant community may decline (point B, B
00
, or B000 in gure 1), or
it may not (point B0 in gure 1). In order to further clarify the e¤ect of foreign acquisition
of peasantsfarmland on the equilibrium size of the peasant community, we complement
the above geometric analysis with a comparative statics analysis so as to highlight the
determinants of the extent to which international acquisition of local farmland shifts the
original upward-sloping curve:
Let   (n; pm; pz; ZF ) = V1 (n; pz; ZF ) V0 (n; pm; ZF ) express the net gain from engaging
in subsistence farming. Taking the partial derivative of the function   (:) with respect to
ZF yields:
 ZF =
@ V1 (n; pz; ZF )
@ZF
  @V0 (n; pm; ZF )
@ZF
;
where  ZF  @  (n; p; pz; ZF ) =@ZF . In other words,  ZF is the algebraic sum of two e¤ects
and may thus be either positive or negative. On the one hand, Proposition 2 states that
the sign of the term
@ V1 (n; pz; ZF )
@ZF
=

pz
pe
  1
Z   ZF

V1 (n; pz; ZF ) (3.4)
is ambiguous. If condition (2.21) holds, then the original downward-sloping curve shifts
down and to the left as in gure 1. In that case, from Proposition 3, the term
@V0 (n; pm; ZF )
@ZF
=

(1  )ZF V0 (n; pm; ZF ) (3.5)
is strictly positive. This means that the net e¤ect,  ZF , will be unambiguously negative:
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 ZF < 0.
If condition (2.20) holds instead, the term in (3.4) will be strictly positive. In gure
1, this corresponds to the shift of the downward-sloping dark-blue curve up and to the
right. In this case, the sign of the net e¤ect,  ZF , is ambiguous. This sign depends on the
magnitude of the e¤ect seen in (3.5). This same term also illustrates that the magnitude of
this e¤ect depends on the =pm ratio. The term  denotes the labor share in the production
process used by the foreign company, while pm denotes the relative price of the imported
substitute for the local subsistence crop. The higher the =pm ratio, the greater the benet
of foreign acquisition of local farmland in terms of wage employment. This ratio is higher
either when the foreign-owned company adopts a su¢ ciently labour-intensive technology
(i.e.,  is su¢ ciently high for a given pm), or when the imported substitute for the domestic
subsistence good is relatively cheap (i.e., pm is su¢ ciently low for a given ). When this is
the case, international acquisition of local farmland will cause comparatively more peasants
to shift from subsistence farming to wage employment as their new source of livelihood,
with the result that  ZF < 0. The following lemma has hereby been established:
Lemma 1. The function   (:) has the following properties:
(i)  n < 0;
(ii)  pm > 0;
(iii)  pz > 0
(iv)  ZF < 0, either if condition (2.21) holds or if =pm is su¢ ciently high:
Since wages adjust, local people will continue to change occupations until the net payo¤
of doing so is zero:
  (n; pm; pz; ZF ) = 0: (3.6)
Therefore, the equilibrium size of the peasant community, n, solves equation (3.6). On
the basis of lemma 1, the implicit function theorem may be applied to obtain the properties
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of the function representing n:
n = N (pm; pz; ZF ) : (3.7)
Proposition 4. If condition (2.21) is fullled, or if =pm is su¢ ciently high, then interna-
tional acquisition of local farmland induce a shift to wage employment (i.e., @n=@ZF < 0),
whereas a high cost of living (as determined by the relative price of the imported good,
pm) increases it (i.e., @n=@pm > 0).
With proposition 4 in hand, we can now properly begin our investigation of the welfare
e¤ects of international acquisition of local farmland.
3.4. FDIs in Farmlands and the Welfare of Local Populations
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands on the economic well-being of
local populations (including subsistence farmers and wage earners). Since, in equilibrium,
peasants and wage earners achieve the same level of utility irrespective of their occupational
choice (otherwise peasants would continue to move from the low-utility occupation to the
high-utility one), we can use (3.6) and (3.7) to rewrite this shared utility payo¤ as follows:
V^ (pm; pz; ZF ) = [1   (1  ")]

 (1  ")
  pzZF
 
1 

Z   ZF
N (pm; pz; ZF )

; (3.8)
where V^ (pm; pz; ZF )  V1 [N (pm; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ]. The e¤ect of international land invest-
ment deals on community memberswelfare can therefore be characterized by the partial
derivative of the function V^ (pm; pz; :) with respect to ZF :
@V^ (pm; pz; ZF )
@ZF
=
@ V1 [N (pm; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ]
@ZF
+
@ V1 ([N (pm; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ])
@n
@n
@ZF
: (3.9)
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We know from lemma 1 and from proposition 4 that
@ V1 ([N (p; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ])
@n
@n
@ZF
> 0 (3.10)
if the =pm ratio is su¢ ciently high. However, as shown in Proposition 2, the sign of the
rst term on the right-hand side of (3.9) is ambiguous, and depends on the land price, pz. A
lower pz may reect either the governments inability to negotiate adequate compensation
for farmland leased to the foreign company or public sector corruption due to lack of
transparency and accountability, and would lead to
@ V1 [N (pm; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ]
@ZF
< 0; (3.11)
while the reverse would hold in the presence of strong state capacity and sound institutional
transparency and accountability.
Observe that even if the inequality in (3.11) holds, the sign of
@V^ (pm; pz; ZF )
@ZF
is still
positive if the =pm ratio is large enough to o¤set the negative e¤ect in (3.11). Likewise,
even if the inequality in (3.10) were to be violated, the sign of
@V^ (pm; pz; ZF )
@ZF
is still
positive if the price of land, pz, is large enough for the positive e¤ect,
@ V1 [N (pm; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ]
@ZF
> 0;
to o¤set the non-positive e¤ect,
@ V1 ([N (pm; pz; ZF ) ; pz; ZF ])
@n
@n
@ZF
 0:
We have just established the su¢ cient conditions for land investment deals to improve the
welfare of local populations:
Proposition 5. If condition (2.20) hold, and if the =pm ratio is also su¢ ciently high,
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then land investment deals raise the welfare of the local population.
In other words, international land investment deals whereby a host nations govern-
ment takes farmland from local people to lease or sell to foreign countries or companies
will improve local peoples welfare if: Land investment deals create enough jobs (i.e., if
 is su¢ ciently high) or if the living costs of adopting wage employment as a source of
livelihood are su¢ ciently low (i.e., if p is su¢ ciently low), and in either of these cases state
capacity must be strong and governance and institutions for accountability must be sound
(satisfying condition (2.20)).
The welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands operate through three di¤erent channels. First,
such deals can counter the adverse e¤ects of traditional subsistence farming norms that
suppress individual e¤ort among local peasants, so long as the government can secure
su¢ ciently lucrative deals, and use the proceed to boost local farmersuse of modern inputs.
Second, they create job opportunities for local people, and can induce a welfare-enhancing
transition of local people out of quasi-subsistence livelihoods and into modern livelihoods
characterized by wage employment. This is likely to be the case when foreign companies
adopt labour-intensive technologies and/or their activities generate su¢ cient upstream and
downstream linkages leading to new and rewarding employment opportunities for local
people. Third, they entrech export-oriented agriculture, and thus cause displaced farmers
who shifted to wage employment to become dependent on food imports for consumption.
This is likely to be the case if land investment deals are primarily designed to satisfy
the interests of foreign countries, as is assumed in this paper. So long as the price of
food imports is su¢ ciently low, this may provide a third mechanism through which land
investment deals improve welfare in the local community.
The above analysis thus points to three factors which are likely to explain opposition
to land investment deals in Africa: (i) The domestic government lacks the capacity and
willingness to negotiate lucrative land deals with foreign investors; (ii) the government
is corrupt or unaccountable to the targeted local communities; and (iii) the living costs
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of shifting from subsistence livelihoods to modern livelihoods characterized by wage em-
ployment are too high. The third condition is particularly likely in view of the fact that
international
land investment deals have taken place in the context of global food crisis, characterized
by rising food prices. For poor countries which are already food-insecure, dependence on
international markets for food (as induced by foreign acquisition of peasants farmland)
runs the risk of exacerbating food insecurity in countries where such deals are made.
4. Conclusion
We studied the welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands. We highlighted four specic mecha-
nisms driving these e¤ects. First, subsistence farming takes place in a context where the
culture of forced mutual help e¤ectively amounts to a community tax on peasants who
obtain a harvest surplus through the use of modern farm inputs. This community tax
stems from the social obligation to share their harvested surplus with less fortunate kin.
The social pressure created by this informal arrangement entrenches a subsistence farming
norm where no peasant has an incentive to modernizing subsistence farming.
Second, farmland leased or sold to prot-oriented foreign companies generates public
funds that are invested in the subsidization of the costs of modernizing subsistence farming.
This may include subsidies on fertilizer and high-yielding seeds, as well as the construction
of locks and dams to encourage the practice of irrigation farming. This feature of the
model provides a role for international acquisition of local farmland to promote the use of
modern inputs by local farmers.
Third, peasants displaced by international acquisition of local farmland shift to wage
employment as employees in foreign-owned companies. How rewarding this transition
is depends directly on the magnitude of job opportunities created by these land deals.
In particular, the degree of labour-intensity of the technology adopted by the foreign-
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owned company is a constraint on peasants shift to wage employment. The shift to
wage employment is greater when the foreign-owned company uses a more labour-intensive
technology.
Finally, farmland leased or sold to foreign investors is used solely to grow an export crop,
thus entrenching export-oriented agriculture as a feature of international land investment
deals. As a result, displaced farmers who shift to wage employment become dependent on
imports that substitute for the subsistence crop they previously grew in their community.
They must nance imports of this substitute with their labour earnings. The cost of living
associated with this new livelihood introduces a channel through which land investment
deals may reduce welfare among local population, particularly in the context of a global
food crisis. When the price of imported food is too high, the welfare of displaced peasants
decreases, causing them to retreat to subsistence livelihoods. Only when the price of im-
ports is su¢ ciently low will the situation of displaced peasants improve with this transition
to wage employment.
We show that a model that incorporates these features can help identify su¢ cient con-
ditions for foreign acquisition of Africas farmlands to make local populations better o¤: (i)
State capacity and willingness to negotiate land investment deals that benet local popula-
tions must be su¢ ciently high; (ii) there must be su¢ cient sources of alternative livelihoods
for displaced farmers; and (iii) the shift to wage employment must make displaced peasants
better o¤ compared to pre-FDIs subsistance livelihood.
Condition (iii) may be obtained by regulations prescribing that the domestic market
becomes the primary focus of land investment deals, while condition (ii) can be guaranteed
by regulations prescribing the use of labour-intensive technologies, so as to absorb the
rural labour surplus. However, on the one hand, regulations supporting the realization of
conditions (ii) and (iii) may be di¢ cult to pass if the political and institutional reforms
needed to support condition (i) are not passed rst. If these regulations and reforms
could be put into place before negotiating with foreign countries and companies for the
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lease or sale of farmlands, local communities targeted by international acquisition of local
farmlands could indeed be made better o¤. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if
regulations that ensure that conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are fullled in targeted countries
also maximize the prot of foreign investors. In the a¢ rmative, a win-win situation may
indeed occur. But existing facts on international acquisition of local farmlands are not
encouraging in this regard. In particular, countries involved in the acquisition of African
farmlands, namely Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia,
South Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, all have a vested interest
in outsourcing their own food security in order to escape high food prices (GRAIN, 2008).
Arguably, for foreign investors, prot may be maximized by entrenching export-oriented
agriculture in targeted countries. If the targeted countries are themselves food-insecure, as
is the case for Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan, just to name a few, food security
for the investor countries may trade-o¤ food security of in the targeted countries as a result
of the export focus of land investment deals. For the government of the targeted countries,
condition (iii) may therefore be at odds with the interests of foreign food security seekers, as
may condition (ii) which prescribes the use of labour-intensive technologies, when perhaps,
mechanization that leads to labor-saving technologies may be prot-maximizing instead.
Both conditions indeed may make it less protable for foreign companies to pursue land-
investment deals in Africa, implying that a win-win situation may not be feasible.
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